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Checks and Balances from Abroad 
Ashley Deeks† 
Judicial and scholarly discussions about checks and balances almost always 
focus on actions and reactions by domestic actors. At least in the intelligence area, 
however, foreign actors can have direct and indirect influences on US checks and 
balances. New national-security challenges require increased cooperation with for-
eign intelligence partners. Leaks and voluntary transparency mean that far more 
information is publicly available about intelligence missions. And robust legal 
rules now bind the United States and other Western intelligence services. 
These changes create opportunities for foreign leaders, citizens, corporations, 
and peer intelligence services to affect the quantum of power within the executive or 
the allocation of power among the three branches of the US government. First, 
some of these foreign influences can trigger the traditional operation of checks and 
balances in the US system. Second, these foreign actions simulate some of the ef-
fects produced by US checks and balances, even if they do not stimulate the US 
system to act endogenously. Whether one views these foreign constraints as positive 
or detrimental, understanding them is critical to an informed conversation about 
the extent to which the executive is truly unfettered in the national-security arena. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a truism that the executive has accrued the lion’s share 
of power and control in the US national-security arena. One key 
reason is Congress’s inability to conduct appropriate levels of in-
telligence oversight.1 The executive possesses significant infor-
mational and operational advantages, members of Congress face 
limited incentives to conduct oversight that does not advance 
constituent interests, and congressional staffing and technical 
expertise are insufficient to the task.2 As a result, the checks 
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 1 See Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the 
War on Terror, 97 Cal L Rev 301, 331 (2009) (“[C]hecks and balances can make a positive 
contribution to national security by compelling the executive to submit to congressional 
scrutiny.”). The executive has also accrued power in the national-security area because 
the judiciary has historically been reluctant to decide issues that it sees as assigned to 
the political branches or as beyond its competence to assess. See, for example, Stephen I. 
Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 Colum L Rev Sidebar 122, 122–27 (2011). 
 2 See Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 
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and balances that are a critical aspect of our democracy are par-
ticularly fragile in areas such as cyberoperations, electronic sur-
veillance, and covert operations. 
In the face of this weakened system of checks and balances, 
scholars have examined potential substitutes for vigorous inter-
branch competition. One strand of scholarship argues that exec-
utive intrabranch competition can produce policies that take in-
to account a broader balance of interests.3 Another strand 
asserts that, during periods of divided government, competition 
between political parties serves a function comparable to inter-
branch separation of powers.4 Other work argues that participa-
tion by private actors in the administrative process can enhance 
accountability.5 
Almost no scholarship has explored the potential or actual 
impact of foreign actors on US checks and balances.6 At first 
glance, this is unsurprising: checks and balances are a domestic 
constitutional concept, and the rules regulating interstate in-
teractions—international law—are disinterested in how states 
organize themselves internally.7 It turns out, however, that a 
 
Stan L Rev 289, 299 (2012) (“[M]eaningfully monitoring intelligence activities requires 
sophisticated expertise among the overseers that is difficult to acquire.”). The recent 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on interrogation and detention was 
notable in large part because of its uniqueness. See generally Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence: Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Detention and Interrogation Program Together with Foreword by Chairman Feinstein 
and Additional and Minority Views, S Rep No 113-288, 113th Cong, 2d Sess (2014). 
 3 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship between 
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L J 423, 439–40 (2009); Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2316 (2006) (describing “executive v. executive” as a 
second-best method of checks and balances). 
 4 See generally, for example, Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation 
of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv L Rev 2312 (2006). 
 5 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543, 
549 (2000). But see Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U Chi L Rev 717, 719 
(2010) (describing various privatization practices as “executive aggrandizing”). 
 6 See generally Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presiden-
cy after 9/11 (Norton 2012) (describing a set of domestic actors outside the federal 
government that amplify the existing system of checks and balances). See also Daniel 
Abebe, The Global Determinants of U.S. Foreign Affairs Law, 49 Stan J Intl L 1, 17–19 
(2013) (“The gap in the literature is the failure to appreciate that a systematic under-
standing of the [external constraints] might shed light on the appropriate level of [inter-
nal constraints] on the President.”). 
 7 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art 27, TIAS No 18232, 1155 
UNTS 331, 339 (May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan 27, 1980). See also Jonathan I. 
Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 Am J Intl L 805, 806 (1989) (“The 
checks and balances built into the system were designed principally to protect the direct 
interests of the states and their citizens, not foreign states or aliens.”). 
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variety of foreign actors—including leaders, courts, citizens, and 
corporations—have the capacity to affect either the quantum of 
power within a single branch or the allocation of power among 
the three branches of the US government, particularly in the ar-
ea of intelligence activity.8 
This Essay makes two related arguments about foreign in-
fluences on US checks and balances. First, these foreign influ-
ences can stimulate the traditional operation of checks and bal-
ances in the US system. That is, the foreign action prompts one 
or more of the branches to act in ways that are consistent with 
the conventional understanding of how checks and balances op-
erate. This Essay terms these actions “external prompts.” Se-
cond, and more controversially, these foreign actions replicate 
some of the effects produced by the US system of checks and 
balances, even if they do not stimulate the US system to act en-
dogenously. The Essay terms these “external checks.” The 
Framers envisioned that checks and balances among the 
branches would serve several functions: ensuring that no branch 
unduly expands its constitutionally assigned role,9 fostering de-
liberation to produce better policies,10 and precluding one branch 
from consolidating excessive power.11 Part II explores how four 
types of foreign actions serve as external prompts, external 
checks, or both. 
 
 8 This Essay assumes that checks and balances are not a zero-sum game; one can 
restrict the flexibility of the executive without directly empowering Congress or the 
courts. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 
150 U Pa L Rev 603, 637 (2001) (critiquing the idea that the power of the three branches 
is a zero-sum game). 
 9 See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 122 (1976) (“The Framers regarded the checks 
and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-
executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the 
expense of the other.”); Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 347–48 (Wesleyan 
1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (advocating that “the interior structure of the government . . . 
be the means of keeping [the constituent parts] in their proper places”). 
 10 See Holmes, 97 Cal L Rev at 328 (cited in note 1) (“[W]e need to look beneath 
formal compliance with checks and balances to the arrangement’s underlying rationale—
namely the idea that the duty of the president to report to Congress will prevent at least 
some ill-conceived policies from being adopted. This is a hope or expectation shared by 
the Framers.”). 
 11 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 Colum L 
Rev 515, 518 (2015) (“For those troubled by relatively unencumbered, concentrated power 
. . . the Framers’ commitment to checks and balances provided, and still provides, an 
answer.”); Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of 
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 Ga L Rev 117, 120 (2011) (“[T]he Framers sought to 
prevent any single branch from accumulating unchecked power to enact arbitrary laws.”). 
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The persuasiveness of this account depends on one’s view of 
how much the executive needs assistance from foreign actors. If 
one believes that the United States is a Gulliver that has no 
need for—and therefore cannot be constrained by—Lilliputian 
foreign states whose cooperation may advance US national-
security goals, one will be skeptical of this account. Further, 
there undoubtedly are cases in which cooperation with foreign 
states bolsters executive branch authority instead of constrain-
ing it. If, however, one recognizes that US national security in-
creasingly relies on relationships with foreign partners, then the 
idea that the executive responds to foreign critiques and con-
cerns to enable ongoing partnerships has bite. 
Part I briefly describes the reasons for Congress’s weakness 
in conducting intelligence oversight and the executive’s domi-
nance over US intelligence policy. It then considers how a chang-
ing intelligence landscape provides fodder for foreign actors to 
alter this traditional story: new missions require more intelli-
gence partners, leaks and voluntary transparency provide far 
more information about those missions, and the volume of legal 
rules that now bind the US and peer intelligence services makes 
the United States more susceptible to foreign constraints in its 
operations. Part II explores four sources of foreign influence on 
the executive’s national-security policies and Congress’s infor-
mational access: foreign courts, leaders, corporations, and intel-
ligence services. This Part demonstrates how each influence 
serves as an external prompt or external check by prompting the 
executive to self-regulate, improving Congress’s understanding 
of complicated executive cyber and surveillance activities, or 
weakening the executive directly. Part III evaluates foreign ac-
tors’ impact on the allocation of power between the political 
branches.12 
I.  CHECKS AND BALANCES IN A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 
It is well understood that the executive dominates US 
national-security decisionmaking.13 Congress and the courts may 
 
 12 For reasons of space, this Essay largely does not analyze whether the US 
political branches should privilege the acts of certain foreign actors over others. A future 
line of inquiry could consider, for instance, whether foreign Westphalian actors play a 
more important or positive role in this checks and balances story than nonstate actors 
do. Nor does this Essay explore the likely possibility that some executive checks (such as 
foreign litigation) redound to the benefit of foreign citizens rather than US citizens. 
 13 See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: 
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provide specific, limited constraints on the executive, but these 
actors generally leave the executive with broad flexibility to 
conduct military and intelligence operations. Recently, however, 
changes to the context in which the US intelligence community 
operates have created an opening for certain foreign actors to 
influence US intelligence operations. This Part briefly describes 
the traditional power dynamics between Congress and the ex-
ecutive in the intelligence arena and then identifies and ana-
lyzes new forces that are challenging the executive’s operational 
freedom. 
A. Congress’s Challenges 
The structural and political hurdles to robust congressional 
oversight of the executive’s national-security activities are well-
known.14 One important problem is Congress’s heavy reliance on 
the executive for information about intelligence programs, be-
cause Congress has few other ways to learn what the executive 
is doing. Members of the intelligence committees express frus-
tration about the difficulty of extracting information from the 
executive. As Representative Justin Amash once said: “You don’t 
have any idea what kind of things are going on. So you have to 
start just spitting off random questions: Does the government 
have a moon base? . . . Does the government have a cyborg ar-
my?”15 Speaking about the NSA’s phone-records program, Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) member Senator 
Ron Wyden stated: “The New York Times story and the USA 
Today [article revealing the extent of that program] were both 
real wakeup calls.”16 These reactions reveal that the intelligence 
community’s obligation to keep Congress “fully and currently 
 
After the Madisonian Republic 4, 18–19 (Oxford 2010) (describing the limited role for 
Congress and courts in national security). 
 14 See generally Amy B. Zegart, The Roots of Weak Congressional Intelligence 
Oversight (Hoover Institution, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9NYT-THEE. 
 15 Zoë Carpenter, Can Congress Oversee the NSA? (The Nation, Jan 30, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/BW3E-PGUK. See also Serge Grossman and Michael Simon, 
And Congress Shall Know the Truth: The Pressing Need for Restructuring Congressional 
Oversight of Intelligence, 2 Harv L & Pol Rev 435, 439 (2008) (describing “a culture of 
passive resistance within intelligence agencies, where they answer your questions, but 
you have to ask the right questions”) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 16 Kim Zetter, Pro-Privacy Senator Wyden on Fighting the NSA from Inside the 
System (Wired, Oct 23, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UMZ8-8N65 (“[T]here are 
things that even [Wyden] remains ignorant about—such as the ways in which the 
government is using Executive Order 12333 to conduct overseas data collection without 
court oversight.”). 
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informed” about its activities, including new program initiatives 
and actions with major foreign policy implications, is not produc-
ing the desired results.17 
The mismatch between the size of the intelligence communi-
ties and the congressional oversight committees poses another 
problem. For fiscal year 2013, the US intelligence budget was 
approximately $52 billion.18 As House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence member Representative Adam Schiff not-
ed: “The intelligence committees are small, the staff is small, the 
agencies themselves are behemoth.”19 This partly explains the 
limited expertise that constitutes an additional hurdle with 
which congressional committees must grapple.20 The executive’s 
extensive use of complicated technology—especially in the cyber 
and surveillance areas—only exacerbates this problem, because 
it significantly increases the amount of time required for those 
in Congress to understand the technology well enough to ask 
probing questions. This combination of informational reliance on 
the executive and Congress’s lack of technological expertise 
makes it very difficult for Congress to adequately oversee the 
executive’s cyber and surveillance programs. 
B. The Executive’s Advantages 
The executive’s ability to obtain and classify foreign intelli-
gence information gives it the upper hand over Congress and 
others who attempt to conduct oversight.21 The increasing use of 
technology to conduct intelligence operations allows the execu-
tive to collect more and more information at a time when Con-
gress’s capacity to oversee the executive remains unchanged, 
thus increasing the information asymmetry between the execu-
tive and Congress. The executive has collected large amounts of 
telephony metadata under § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,22 as 
 
 17 50 USC § 3091(a)(1) (“The President shall ensure that the congressional 
intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence 
activities of the United States.”). 
 18 Wilson Andrews and Todd Lindeman, $52.6 Billion: The Black Budget (Wash 
Post, Aug 29, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8GJ2-NLHU. 
 19 Carpenter, Can Congress Oversee the NSA? (cited in note 15). 
 20 See Zegart, The Roots of Weak Congressional Intelligence Oversight at *10–11 
(cited in note 14). 
 21 See James A. Baker, Intelligence Oversight, 45 Harv J Legis 199, 204 (2008). 
 22 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) § 215, Pub L No 
107-56, 115 Stat 272, 287–88, codified as amended at 50 USC §§ 1861–62. 
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well as certain e-mail content pursuant to the FISA Amend-
ments Act of 2008.23 To store these data, which include “gargan-
tuan quantities of data from emails, phone calls, Google search-
es and other sources,” the NSA has constructed a massive data 
center in Utah.24 
The executive’s high technology intelligence tools pose a new 
hurdle to not only congressional oversight but also executive 
self-constraint. An executive with the ability to collect billions of 
communications every day might find it highly tempting to do 
just that.25 As President Barack Obama himself has recognized, 
“there is an inevitable bias . . . to collect more information about 
the world, not less. So in the absence of institutional require-
ments for regular debate—and oversight that is public, as well 
as private or classified—the danger of government overreach be-
comes more acute.”26 After all, the executive pays the highest 
price among the three branches of government if a terrorist at-
tack occurs, and so it has the most robust incentives to employ 
all tools at its disposal to protect national security.27 
Notwithstanding the executive’s technological superiority to 
Congress, even the executive occasionally does not fully under-
stand its own surveillance capabilities. The general counsel of 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has noted that 
“[t]hese are some incredibly complicated systems that NSA was 
not able to fully and accurately articulate to the [Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court], in large part because no one at NSA 
had a full understanding of how the program was operating at 
the time.”28 This further illustrates how difficult it is to check 
the executive’s cyber and surveillance operations. 
 
 23 Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, codified as amended in various sections of Ti-
tles 8, 18, and 50. See also generally U.S. Intelligence Community Surveillance One Year 
after President Obama’s Address (Brookings Institution, Feb 4, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DD8T-4SQB (describing various collection programs). 
 24 Rory Carroll, Welcome to Utah, the NSA’s Desert Home for Eavesdropping on 
America (The Guardian, June 14, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/SNV6-YBHX. 
 25 See Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of 
the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies *46–48 
(Dec 12, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/H76R-SZAS. 
 26 Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (DOJ, Jan 17, 2014) 
(“NSA Speech”), archived at http://perma.cc/CP7W-8F4N. 
 27 See Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive 
Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 Fordham L Rev 827, 887 (2013) (“In times of 
emergency, the executive often has undue incentives to focus on security equities and 
reduced incentives to weigh individual rights properly against those equities.”). 
 28 Cyrus Farivar, NSA: No One “Had a Full Understanding” of 2009 Call-Checking 
Program (Ars Technica, Sept 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/53M2-JLXT. 
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C. A Changing Intelligence Landscape 
The backdrop against which intelligence agencies operate is 
changing in a way that affects executive power. These changes 
make it harder for the executive to keep its intelligence activi-
ties secret, force the executive to rely more heavily on other 
states for intelligence and related assistance, and render the ex-
ecutive more sensitive to the relevance of law to its intelligence 
activities. Thus, while the executive continues to accrue and ex-
ercise vast technological powers to conduct national-security ac-
tivities, many of which occur outside the United States, it faces 
more avenues by which foreign actors can seek to curtail those 
activities. 
1. New missions. 
First, the missions that the United States now asks its intel-
ligence agencies to undertake require greater cooperation with 
other states.29 Further, because the missions increasingly affect 
nonstate actors, they expose US intelligence agencies to greater 
criticism and litigation.30 In espionage’s long history, the majority 
of state intelligence activities were directed almost exclusively 
against other states. But since the 1990s, the United States has 
faced far more serious threats from nonstate actors who are 
committed to terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, and transnational crime.31 Serious threats to a state’s 
security can now emanate from nonstate actors who are located 
in geographically remote locales. 
As a result, the United States can no longer operate inde-
pendently to achieve its security goals.32 No single intelligence 
 
 29 See Richard J. Aldrich, International Intelligence Cooperation in Practice, in 
Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, eds, International Intelligence Cooperation and 
Accountability 18, 32 (Routledge 2011). 
 30 See, for example, Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings (Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, May 23, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/D65M-9SKA (“[A]nti-Americanism in 
Pakistan is fueled by the domestic media’s portrayal of the U.S. drone campaign as a 
‘scourge targeting innocent civilians.’”); Mark D. Young, National Insecurity: The 
Impacts of Illegal Disclosures of Classified Information, 10 I/S: J L & Pol Info Socy 367, 
403 (2014) (“According to a Pew Research poll conducted shortly after the first 
[disclosures by Edward Snowden], ‘for the first time since 9/11, Americans are now more 
worried about civil liberties abuses than terrorism.’”). 
 31 See, for example, John D. Negroponte, Annual Threat Assessment of the Director 
of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence *4 (Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, Feb 2, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/V2V6-GFRA. 
 32 See Ashley Deeks, Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law, in 
Samuel Rascoff and Zachary Goldman, eds, Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing 
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community can obtain all the coverage it desires on its own or 
suppress external threats without working with foreign intelli-
gence services.33 By cooperating with peer intelligence services, 
the United States can take advantage of other services’ better 
linguists, more nuanced cultural understandings of geopolitics, 
and relative geographic advantages in intercepting third-party 
states’ communications. For example, the “Five Eyes” arrange-
ment among the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada allocates electronic surveillance col-
lection geographically among its members.34 In sum, notwith-
standing the executive’s increased technological capabilities, it 
depends on foreign intelligence services to help it manage to-
day’s threats. 
The targets of US intelligence have changed, too. US intelli-
gence missions today include far more contact with individual 
nonstate actors, whether in the form of targeted killings, rendi-
tions, detention, interrogation, or electronic surveillance. Be-
cause electronic surveillance allows states to detect and sup-
press terrorist acts, surveillance agencies now collect bulk data, 
which implicates the communications of millions of private ac-
tors. As Obama has noted, “the same technological advances 
that allow U.S. intelligence agencies to pinpoint an al Qaeda cell 
in Yemen or an email between two terrorists in the Sahel also 
mean that many routine communications around the world are 
within our reach.”35 Each of these missions increases interac-
tions between intelligence agencies and private individuals. This 
creates a group of “victims” who have publicly attempted to cab-
in US intelligence activities, whether by engaging the media or 
their leaders, suing US officials who participated in the activi-
ties, or suing their own governments for cooperating with US in-
telligence services.36 
 
Security in the Twenty-First Century *5–6 (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). 
 33 See Aldrich, International Intelligence Cooperation in Practice at 32 (cited in note 29). 
 34 Conor Friedersdorf, Is ‘the Five Eyes Alliance’ Conspiring to Spy on You? (The 
Atlantic, June 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/F22S-TMPK. 
 35 NSA Speech (cited in note 26). 
 36 See, for example, Scott Shane, N.S.A. Phone Data Collection Is Illegal, A.C.L.U. 
Says (NY Times, Aug 26, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/43NH-S4EW; Ravi Somaiya, 
Drone Strike Prompts Suit, Raising Fears for U.S. Allies (NY Times, Jan 30, 2013), 
archived at http://perma.cc/RGM7-QT27. 
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2. New transparency. 
Second, public access to information about intelligence activi-
ties has skyrocketed in the past ten years. More of the executive’s 
intelligence activities are being revealed to a panoply of foreign 
actors, including states, victims, journalists, and corporations. 
This has resulted from both leaks and voluntary transparency by 
intelligence agencies. For example, Edward Snowden’s 2013 leaks 
about the activities of the NSA and the UK Government Com-
munications Headquarters (GCHQ) exposed the fact that the 
NSA and the GCHQ collect massive amounts of telecommunica-
tions and Internet information from average citizens, both US 
and foreign. The executive branch, under pressure from foreign 
and domestic sources to clarify the legal basis for its targeted 
killing program, gave a series of speeches justifying those uses of 
force.37 The government has also voluntarily declassified various 
documents, including Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
opinions.38 In sum, we know much more today about the intelli-
gence activities that the executive undertakes.39 
Another source of increased transparency is the nature of 
the missions themselves. These new missions allow outsiders to 
more easily detect the physical outcomes of the operations. 
Journalists and nongovernmental organizations have investi-
gated the aftermaths of large numbers of targeted killings in 
Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen.40 Learning about the location, 
timing, and targets of these killings is simplified by the fact that 
drone strikes—unlike, say, efforts to recruit a foreign asset—
leave visible physical damage. Further, those who are directly 
 
 37 See, for example, The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 
(Wilson Center, Apr 30, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/Z6MC-T8WL. 
 38 See, for example, ODNI and DOJ Release Additional Declassified FISC Filings 
and Orders Related to Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act (Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, May 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9GPC-DGZ4. 
 39 It is possible that we know quantitatively more about intelligence operations 
than we used to but proportionately less (or the same amount), given an overall increase 
in intelligence operations and collection. However, writings by individuals who worked 
inside the US intelligence community and the expansion of litigation against intelligence 
actors suggest that we now know proportionately more. See, for example, David S. Kris, 
On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J Natl Sec L & Pol 209, 280–81 (2014) 
(describing the Obama administration’s commitment to increase the transparency of 
intelligence collection, apparently measured against the current baseline). 
 40 See, for example, US: Reassess Targeted Killings in Yemen (Human Rights 
Watch, Oct 21, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ZAD6-XRQE; Karen McVeigh, Drone 
Strikes: Activists Seek to Lift Lid on Open Secret of Targeted Killings (The Guardian, 
June 19, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/A8S7-LJQL. 
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affected by US intelligence activities have incentives to reveal 
those activities in ways that state victims do not. State targets 
often are loath to reveal intelligence activities that other states 
have taken against them because they fear revealing weak-
ness.41 Nonstate victims, in contrast, have many reasons to re-
veal US intelligence activities and few reasons not to. As a re-
sult, these nonstate-actor-focused activities intrinsically create 
more avenues by which they may come to light. 
3. New legalism. 
Finally, various states’ intelligence communities confront 
newly legalistic cultures. More so than fifteen years ago, many 
intelligence communities today are bound by detailed statutes. 
Professor Margo Schlanger identified this phenomenon within 
the NSA as “intelligence legalism,” but the NSA is not unique.42 
Then–CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston stated that “the 
rule of law is integral to Agency operations.”43 Various foreign 
intelligence services, including those of the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia, have become subject to detailed statutes 
since 2000.44 
As intelligence services face more regulation, they have in-
creased their legal staffs to help comply with those regulations. 
The CIA had fewer than 20 lawyers in the mid-1970s and ap-
proximately 150 in 2010.45 These lawyers are increasingly em-
bedded in operations. For example, in the United Kingdom, op-
erators receive legal briefings on domestic and international law 
to ensure that UK intelligence does not facilitate torture or mis-
treatment by other intelligence services.46 
In the past decade, individuals have begun to challenge the 
legality of different forms of intelligence activity in court.47 This 
 
 41 See, for example, Devlin Barrett and Damian Paletta, Officials Masked Severity 
of Hack (Wall St J, June 24, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ZL27-GRFY. 
 42 Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil 
Liberties Gap, 6 Harv Natl Sec J 112, 113 (2015). 
 43  Remarks of CIA General Counsel Stephen W. Preston at Harvard Law School 
(CIA, Apr 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/X28R-VM9P. 
 44 See Deeks, Intelligence Communities at *5 (cited in note 32). 
 45 See Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 87 (cited in note 6). 
 46 See Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition *53 (Crown, July 2007), 
archived at http://perma.cc/EA6Y-Y3SY. 
 47 See, for example, James Risen, Setback for Suit against N.S.A. on Phone Data 
(NY Times, Aug 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8YZQ-WRDW; Charlie Savage, 
Suit over Targeted Killings Is Thrown Out (NY Times, Dec 7, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/VT6R-SHWC. 
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naturally focuses the minds of intelligence officials on legal com-
pliance. And as the work of these communities becomes more 
public, litigation will increase. Leaks such as Snowden’s reveal 
secret programs of which potential plaintiffs may not have been 
aware. Disclosures about intelligence activities also increase the 
likelihood of plaintiffs’ success in litigation, because the disclo-
sures may alter courts’ assessments of jurisdictional issues such as 
standing and privileges such as the state-secrets privilege.48 In-
deed, some plaintiffs have made headway in court: The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has held that Poland and 
Macedonia acted unlawfully in assisting the CIA in hosting se-
cret detention facilities and rendering a person to Afghanistan.49 
A UK court has allowed an individual to proceed with his claim 
that UK and US intelligence services transferred him to the 
Libyan government, which he alleges tortured him.50 
* * * 
These changes to the intelligence landscape render the ex-
ecutive more responsive to foreign influences. This directly af-
fects how the executive exercises its intelligence powers. The 
new transparency gives leverage to a wide range of actors to 
prompt changes to US policy in different forums. The new types 
of intelligence missions produce foreign victims with strong in-
centives to object to the intelligence activities, sometimes by 
claiming that the United States violated foreign or international 
law. And the new legalism confronting various intelligence 
communities means that foreign partners with whom the United 
States must cooperate may impose constraints on the United 
States in joint operations. 
II.  FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON CHECKS AND BALANCES 
Part I shows why the United States often needs the cooper-
ation of foreign states in the national-security arena. The 
stakes are high when cooperation falls apart—perhaps more so 
 
 48 See Deeks, Intelligence Communities at *10 (cited in note 32). 
 49 See Al Nashiri v Poland, App No 28761/11, *216–17 (Eur Ct Hum Rts 2014); 
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, App No 7511/13, *212–13 (Eur Ct Hum Rts 2014); 
El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App No 39630/09, *79–80 (Eur 
Ct Hum Rts 2012). 
 50 Owen Bowcott, Abdel Hakim Belhaj Wins Right to Sue UK Government over His 
Kidnap (The Guardian, Oct 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/DV54-J5NX; Belhaj v 
The Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, 2014 EWCA Civ 1394. 
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in national security than in areas such as trade and the envi-
ronment. Unduly aggressive intelligence policies can make it dif-
ficult for Western allies to maintain cooperation with the United 
States, as a legal and political matter.51 As a result, foreign 
states that wish to continue to cooperate with the US intelligence 
apparatus (because it advances their own security goals) pay 
keen attention to how the US executive conducts its national-
security policies. In turn, the United States pays attention to 
their views, to the extent that those views preview reduced co-
operation or impose legal limits that the United States must 
embrace to conduct joint operations. 
The influence of foreign states on executive power is an out-
growth of a phenomenon identified by Professor Jack Goldsmith.52 
Goldsmith has focused on how actors outside the government, 
such as the US media and nongovernmental organizations, 
helped hold the executive accountable in the face of its massive 
accumulation of power post-9/11.53 But few scholars have spent 
time considering non-US pressures that affect the quantum and 
use of that executive power. Although foreign actors may share 
some motivations in common with domestic actors, they have 
additional motivations because of the ways in which US and for-
eign national-security apparatuses are intertwined. Domestic 
actors contest executive action when they disagree with sub-
stantive policies or when they fear, in a more inchoate sense, an 
unbridled accrual of executive power. Foreign actors may share 
some of those motivations, but they also seek to preserve their 
ability to cooperate with the United States on law-enforcement, 
military, and intelligence matters—which, paradoxically, can 
become harder when the US executive is unfettered. 
 
 51 See Adam D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: 
Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 4 (Routledge 2010) (noting that US use of 
renditions altered the way that the United Kingdom shared intelligence with the United 
States); Alison Smale, Germany Limits Cooperation with U.S. over Data Gathering (NY 
Times, May 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/9T3L-UYVP. 
 52 See Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at xi (cited in note 6) (describing the post-
9/11 efforts of Congress and the Supreme Court to limit executive authority as a 
pushback “harder . . . than in any other war in American history”). 
 53 See generally id. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952), 
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence recognized that external factors such as public 
perceptions of the president could alter the strength of the executive. Jackson stated that 
the president’s “prestige as head of state and his influence upon public opinion [ ] exert[ ] 
a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and balance his power which often 
cancels their effectiveness.” Id at 653–54 (Jackson concurring). 
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This Part explores four contexts in which foreign actions 
have influenced—directly or indirectly—the operation of checks 
and balances within the US government. All four sets of foreign 
actors (courts, leaders, corporations, and intelligence services) 
have reduced executive power in certain circumstances (an ex-
ternal check). The foreign court cases, naming and shaming, and 
constraints by peer intelligence services potentially stimulate 
inter- and intrabranch dialogues about the US policies under 
fire (an external prompt). Those same activities have attempted 
to rein in what the actors view as executive violations of inter-
national law (an external check and prompt). Finally, the nam-
ing and shaming as well as foreign technology company reports 
enhance Congress’s capacity to evaluate and critique executive 
programs, the former by providing (sometimes persuasive) al-
ternative views on the wisdom and legality of executive actions 
and the latter by enhancing Congress’s sophistication about 
technology and threats (an external prompt). 
A. Litigation Abroad Implicating US Policies 
Historically, intelligence cases rarely found their way into 
court, presumably because the victims were foreign states or be-
cause the victims could not attribute the activity to a particular 
perpetrator. Since September 11, 2001, however, both US and 
foreign courts have seen a proliferation of intelligence-related 
litigation. This litigation has garnered more traction abroad 
than domestically; a number of foreign cases directly or indirect-
ly implicate US intelligence activities. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, a former Guantánamo 
detainee challenged the legality of UK intelligence activities, 
claiming that the United Kingdom had provided information to 
the United States, which the CIA employed to question him us-
ing harsh interrogation techniques.54 The UK Court of Appeal 
ordered the UK government to publicly reveal evidence describ-
ing what the United Kingdom knew about the individual’s 
treatment while he was in CIA custody.55 As another example, 
 
 54 See Mohamed v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2010 
EWCA Civ 65, ¶¶ 60–64. The United Kingdom settled the case for millions of pounds. 
Government to Compensate Ex-Guantanamo Bay Detainees (BBC, Nov 16, 2010), 
archived at http://perma.cc/DGD4-R9SF. 
 55 See Richard Norton-Taylor, Binyam Mohamed Torture Evidence Must Be 
Revealed, Judges Rule (The Guardian, Feb 10, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/J3MG 
-CSNG; Mohamed, 2010 EWCA Civ 65 at ¶ 2. 
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the son of a man allegedly killed by a US drone in Pakistan sued 
the GCHQ, claiming that GCHQ employees had abetted murder 
by providing locational intelligence to the CIA so that it could tar-
get the individual.56 Further, the ECHR recently held that Poland 
had violated the rights of two detainees whom the CIA allegedly 
held and mistreated in secret detention facilities in Poland.57 
Some attempts to challenge US intelligence practices take 
the form of criminal prosecutions. Several states are conducting 
criminal investigations or prosecutions of individuals who are 
associated with US intelligence activities. Italy prosecuted and 
convicted in absentia a number of US intelligence and military 
officials for allegedly rendering a radical sheikh from Milan to 
Egypt.58 A Lithuanian prosecutor recently reopened an investi-
gation of reports that Lithuania hosted a secret CIA detention 
facility; the focus is likely to be on senior Lithuanian intelligence 
officials.59 A Pakistani judge recently ordered the state to file 
criminal charges against two former CIA officials who were in-
volved with the drone program.60 And it seems likely that more 
cases against US officials might follow in the wake of the SSCI’s 
interrogation report. 
When the results of foreign litigation produce judicial deci-
sions revealing and restricting the intelligence activities of the 
United States or its partners, this alters the legal landscape with-
in which both intelligence communities operate. This litigation 
and its outcomes serve as external checks by limiting the ability 
of particular US officials to travel.61 Far more significantly, these 
 
 56 See Somaiya, Drone Strike Prompts Suit (cited in note 36) (noting that the case 
raised the prospect of legal liability for European officials by linking them to the US 
drone campaign, which is widely seen as illegal in their home states). The UK Court of 
Appeal ultimately ruled against the claimant. Khan v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, 2014 EWCA Civ 24, ¶ 53. 
 57 See Adam Goldman, European Court Finds Poland Complicit in CIA ‘Torture,’ 
Orders Detainee Compensation (Wash Post, July 24, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6L8E-MK75 (describing the cases of Al Nashiri v Poland, App No 
28761/11 (Eur Ct Hum Rts 2014), and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, App No 
7511/13 (Eur Ct Hum Rts 2014)). 
 58 See Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts 23 Americans for C.I.A. Renditions (NY 
Times, Nov 4, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/VJ86-75WL; Craig Whitlock, Testimony 
Helps Detail CIA’s Post-9/11 Reach (Wash Post, Dec 16, 2006), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C54W-U7LH. 
 59 Andrius Sytas and Christian Lowe, Exclusive: Lithuanian Prosecutors Restart 
Investigation into CIA Jail (Reuters, Apr 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U9W8-899P. 
 60 Pakistan Judge Orders Charges against Ex-CIA Officials over Drone Deaths (Al 
Jazeera America, Apr 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FT6C-EABC. 
 61 See, for example, Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, Panama Releases Former 
CIA Operative Wanted by Italy (Wash Post, July 19, 2013), archived at 
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cases constrain the executive indirectly by limiting the ways in 
which its intelligence partners can cooperate with it. Additional-
ly, it creates what I have elsewhere referred to as an “observer 
effect.”62 Due to this observer effect, the threat of having a court 
adjudicate and reject a national-security policy gives both US and 
foreign executives incentives to render those policies more rights-
protective even before the court weighs in.63 The litigation de-
scribed above creates an observer effect for US intelligence part-
ners who have suffered losses in court and who are more likely to 
be more cautious in shaping future, related policies. This in turn 
further narrows the scope of cooperation that the US executive 
can obtain from its partners. These cases thus serve as external 
checks that diminish the power of the executive. 
These cases largely reflect efforts by foreign plaintiffs to en-
force domestic laws against their own governments. But both 
these cases and the naming/shaming and peer constraints dis-
cussed in Part II.B rely on international law as part of their le-
gal argumentation. In some cases, the United States shares the 
international law obligations at issue. As a result, these actors 
are directly imposing their interpretations of international law 
on the executive and blocking its perceived violations.64 These 
foreign actions may also force the executive to reconsider its ex-
isting interpretation of international law—and they could stimu-
late Congress to question whether executive policies are compli-
ant with the law. This forcing of dialogue, whether it occurs 
between branches or entirely within the executive, emerges from 
an external prompt. 
B. Naming and Shaming by Foreign Leaders 
Another way in which foreign actors narrow the range of ex-
ecutive national-security activity is by directly criticizing the ex-
ecutive’s intelligence policies, accusing the executive of violating 
international law, and demanding change. One direct result of 
Snowden’s leaks was a slew of complaints from foreign leaders 
about US extraterritorial surveillance. German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel chastised President Obama for allowing the NSA to 
 
http://perma.cc/BSC5-7HCS (stating that a former CIA agent convicted by an Italian 
court faced potential deportation from Panama). 
 62 Deeks, 82 Fordham L Rev at 830–31 (cited in note 27). 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Goldsmith, Power and Constraint at 225 (cited in note 6) (describing foreign 
states as negotiating “favored understandings of the law”). 
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monitor her phone calls.65 Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff 
canceled her state visit to the United States, sending an unmis-
takable signal that Brazil was displeased with this spying.66 Re-
gardless of the sincerity or hypocrisy of these accusations, the 
political pressure resulted in US policy changes.67 
In January 2014, Obama announced: “[U]nless there is a 
compelling national security purpose, we will not monitor the 
communications of heads of state and government of our close 
friends and allies.”68 The accompanying presidential policy di-
rective “suggests that the United States will limit its existing 
surveillance of certain states’ leadership” and will be more cau-
tious before engaging in surveillance against “the leadership of a 
significant number of states.”69 The press later reported that the 
CIA had stopped spying on “friendly governments in Western 
Europe in response to the furor over a German caught selling 
secrets to the United States and the Edward Snowden revela-
tions of classified information held by the National Security 
Agency.”70 If true, the US policy decision to suspend collection is 
an example of self-constraint flowing—in notable part—from 
public naming and shaming by allies. These decisions did not 
necessarily empower Congress at the expense of the executive, 
but they did subtract power from the executive’s side of the 
ledger. 
Because these foreign actions are highly public, they also 
serve to educate all executive actors about highly classified US 
intelligence policies. By bringing into the conversation executive 
actors (such as the State Department) that presumably did not 
participate in the initial policy setting, the subsequent policy de-
cisions reevaluating US activity may incorporate the equities of 
 
 65 See Geir Moulson and John-Thor Dahlburg, German Chancellor Confronts 
Obama over Reported Spying (Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Oct 23, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/57R4-GWZZ. 
 66 Brazil’s Rousseff Cancels State Visit to U.S. over Spying - Report (Reuters, Sept 
17, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9HF6-UL6F. 
 67 See Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 Va J 
Intl L 291, 330 (2015). 
 68 NSA Speech (cited in note 26). 
 69 Deeks, 55 Va J Intl L at 330 (cited in note 67). See also Presidential Policy 
Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities (The White House, Jan 17, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TCB7-HCEJ (stating that it is “essential that national security 
policymakers consider carefully the value of signals intelligence activities in light of the 
risks entailed in conducting these activities”). 
 70 Ken Dilanian, CIA Halts Spying in Europe (AP, Sept 20, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8REC-U9RE. 
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a wider set of actors.71 These external prompts therefore may 
contribute to the “second-best,” intrabranch form of checks and 
balances envisioned by Professor Neal Katyal.72 When a foreign 
actor seeks to impose a constraint on the executive, the execu-
tive often has a choice: accept the constraint and continue inter-
state cooperation, or reject the constraint and evaluate alterna-
tives that do not require the cooperation of another state. In 
making that choice, the executive branch must internally assess 
the costs and benefits of both approaches. Those conversations 
require the executive to evaluate the importance of the opera-
tions at issue and the validity of foreign concerns. The foreign 
acts thus force intrabranch deliberations that may produce more 
carefully considered policies. 
C. High Technology Cyberfirms 
One theory about how Congress conducts oversight is the 
“fire alarm” theory, which holds that Congress relies on outside 
influences, including whistleblowers and the press, to alert it to 
situations in which agencies violate congressional mandates.73 
This oversight trigger helps compensate for Congress’s inferior 
knowledge about executive activities and allows members of 
Congress to target oversight toward activities that interest their 
constituents. Although the fire alarm approach is less common 
in the national-security area because of the clandestine nature 
of intelligence,74 the Snowden leaks serve as a paradigmatic re-
cent example. Far less remarked on, however, is a different ex-
ternal source of information about US cyberactivity: foreign 
cyberfirms.75 These firms, which are extremely technologically 
 
 71 See, for example, Holmes, 97 Cal L Rev at 330 (cited in note 1) (“Excessive 
compartmentalization within the executive prevents knowledgeable experts ensconced in 
one executive agency from pointing out the flaws in the evidence being used by another 
executive agency to set national policy.”). 
 72 Katyal, 115 Yale L J at 2316 (cited in note 3). 
 73 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am J Polit Sci 165, 166 (1984) 
(describing the police-patrol and the fire alarm models of congressional oversight). 
 74 See Grossman and Simon, 2 Harv L & Pol Rev at 438 (cited in note 15). 
 75 To be fair, foreign technology firms are not the only firms producing these 
reports. Several American firms, such as FireEye/Mandiant and CrowdStrike, have done 
so as well, though their reports tend to identify foreign authors of espionage and 
hacking, including Russia and China, and generally have not attributed cyberespionage 
to the United States. See generally APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage 
Units (Mandiant), archived at http://perma.cc/W2H5-PLKP; CrowdStrike Global Threat 
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capable and which often work on behalf of corporate clients, in-
vestigate sophisticated cyberespionage, hacking, and other at-
tacks on their clients’ computer systems. They defend their cli-
ents against these cyberoperations and produce credible reports 
describing the operations and the likely attacker—which is often 
a state actor, and often the United States. 
One of the most prominent foreign cyberfirms is Kaspersky 
Lab, a Moscow-based company that helps clients combat cyber-
threats, including malware, hackers, and cyberespionage.76 
Kaspersky helped identify the Stuxnet worm in 2010—a computer 
attack directed at Iran’s nuclear program and reportedly created 
by the United States and Israel.77 Kaspersky later discovered and 
reported on Flame, an espionage tool kit that sabotages infra-
structure and that has infected systems in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, 
and Sudan, among others.78 The firm also recently reported that 
it discovered on customer machines NSA tools directly related to 
Stuxnet. The report disclosed in detail how the platforms work, 
including by giving the attackers complete, persistent control of 
infected systems for years without detection.79 
Assume that Kaspersky correctly attributed these opera-
tions to the United States. It is not known whether the executive 
had already informed Congress of these operations. But even if 
the executive had informed the congressional intelligence com-
mittees, these projects would be so highly classified that the ex-
ecutive likely would have told only the committees’ leadership. 
In contrast, these foreign reports allow all members of Congress 
to better understand cyberthreats generally and (possible) US 
capabilities in particular. 
These high technology reports are particularly relevant be-
cause they provide information about an area of operations in 
which intrabranch checks and balances may not be effective. 
Cyberoperations are often highly classified, so actors inside 
agencies such as the State and Treasury Departments may not 
have access to or input regarding the operations. Further, the 
operations are so technical that many people in other agencies, 
even if given access, are ill equipped to question the operations 
 
 76 See About Kaspersky Lab (Kaspersky Lab), archived at http://perma.cc/U5RL-SLCE. 
 77 See Deirdre Fernandes, Kaspersky Lab Cites Growing Cyber Threats (Boston 
Globe, Mar 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ST72-ZPEX. 
 78 See Kim Zetter, Meet ‘Flame,’ the Massive Spy Malware Infiltrating Iranian 
Computers (Wired, May 28, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/QYP4-SFKP. 
 79 See Kim Zetter, Suite of Sophisticated Nation-State Attack Tools Found with 
Connection to Stuxnet (Wired, Feb 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/54HC-X6Z2. 
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or their potential unforeseen consequences.80 Ironically, these 
technology firms are more likely than most bureaucratic actors 
within the executive branch to have the technological sophistica-
tion to match the NSA and the CIA. 
The activities of these firms thus amplify US checks and 
balances in three ways. First, reports on US cyberoperations di-
rectly constrain the executive by limiting the breadth of tools in 
its cyberarsenal.81 Now that cyberexperts around the world un-
derstand Stuxnet and Flame, the United States can no longer 
employ those types of cyberweapons in future actions. Second, at 
times these firms act as the executive’s competitors. They defend 
their clients from possible NSA and foreign cyberactivities and 
provide protection to corporations that some think the executive 
branch itself should provide.82 When technology firms rather 
than the executive provide corporate defense, the executive ob-
tains less threat information and accordingly is less empowered. 
Third, these technology firms help Congress overcome its infor-
mational disadvantages on technology and information about 
US intelligence-community operations.83 It is hardly a perfect fix, 
of course; these reports provide a window into a narrow part of 
US cyberoperations rather than a systematic education to those 
tasked with overseeing the executive’s cyberactivity. But if Con-
gress feels that it is underinformed and ill equipped to under-
stand the impact of cybertools used by and against the United 
States, these reports help counter those problems and may 
prompt Congress more generally to assert a role in setting US 
cyberstrategy.84 These reports thus serve as external prompts, 
stimulating domestic checks and balances. 
 
 80 See Zegart, The Roots of Weak Congressional Intelligence Oversight at *10–11 
(cited in note 14). 
 81 For those who favor strong national-security policies, these reports are highly 
problematic and costly for the United States, even though the companies obtained their 
information using lawful cybertools (vice leaks). 
 82 See, for example, About Kaspersky Lab (cited in note 76). 
 83 See Zegart, The Roots of Weak Congressional Intelligence Oversight at *18 (cited 
in note 14) (“Meaningful oversight requires good questions, and good questions require 
expertise. Unless Congress fosters institutional mechanisms to develop greater 
expertise, more executive branch information will only go so far.”). 
 84 See Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber Warfare, 4 J Natl Sec L & Pol 155, 
159–60 (2010). 
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D. Peer Constraints 
The three phenomena discussed in the previous sections 
serve to publicly limit executive intelligence operations, stimu-
late inter- or intrabranch dialogue, or enforce international law 
against the executive. But foreign influence takes more subtle 
forms as well. The legal limitations that govern one intelligence 
service can constrain not just that service but also the peer ser-
vices with which the first one interacts.85 For example, one intel-
ligence service may wish to transfer an individual to another 
state’s custody but may fear that the receiving state will mis-
treat him.86 The transferring state may require assurances that 
the receiving state will not engage in certain actions against the 
transferred individual and may also require the receiving state 
to allow continued access to the individual posttransfer.87 Post-
9/11, the United Kingdom imposed these types of formal con-
straints on the US executive.88 
Constraints on US intelligence activity take other forms as 
well. The United Kingdom refused to allow the United States to 
use UK airbases or airspace for US renditions because it did not 
support US rendition policy.89 Germany instructed its domestic 
intelligence service not to provide US intelligence officials with 
information that would enable them to locate German citizens 
and use force against them.90 And states that initially permitted 
the United States to establish secret detention facilities on their 
territory post-9/11 ultimately withdrew that consent as they be-
came increasingly uncomfortable with how unfettered the US 
executive was. As a result, the CIA had to terminate its secret 
detention and interrogation program.91 
Some have lamented the limited nature of oversight and ac-
countability that surrounds bilateral intelligence liaison 
 
 85 See generally Deeks, Intelligence Communities (cited in note 32). 
 86 See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition 
and the Rule of Law, 75 Geo Wash L Rev 1333, 1379–94 (2007). 
 87 See Ashley S. Deeks, Avoiding Transfers to Torture 10 (Council on Foreign Rela-
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 88 See ISC, Rendition at *43 (cited in note 46) (noting that caveats have been placed 
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 89 See Straw Denies ‘Torture’ Cover-Up (BBC, Jan 20, 2006), archived at 
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 91 See S Rep No 113-288 at xxiv (cited in note 2). 
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relationships.92 These relationships, however, may in some cases 
constrain US intelligence operations, even when those limita-
tions flow not from US statutes but transitively from the domes-
tic and international law obligations of states with which the 
United States must cooperate. In some cases, these constraints 
operate before the executive can act; in contrast, many of the 
domestic constraints in the intelligence area operate ex post and 
so may be less effective.93 Further, these foreign intelligence ser-
vices serve as watchers over executive activity that no other ac-
tor within the US system can observe, and to that extent they 
provide legal oversight that is otherwise difficult to conduct.94 
III.  EVALUATING FOREIGN INFLUENCES 
If one hopes to analyze with greater accuracy how unfettered 
the executive has truly become in the post-9/11 era, it is im-
portant to look beyond the formalism of a closed system of checks 
and balances. Whether one conceives of the foreign actors de-
scribed in Part II as external prompts (exogenous stimulants to 
traditional actors in the US system of checks and balances) or as 
external checks (foreign players whose actions simulate some of 
the effects on the executive that our system of checks and balanc-
es produces), these foreign actors help suppress or amplify the 
powers of each of the three branches. 
At the same time, treating certain external influences as af-
fecting US checks and balances poses line-drawing problems. Af-
ter all, not all interactions between the United States and foreign 
actors should be treated as implicating domestic checks and bal-
ances. This problem is not unique to foreign influences on checks 
and balances, of course. Scholars who study checks and balances 
that are internal to the US system and who believe that actors 
such as corporations and the media influence the balance of pow-
er between the branches must draw lines as well, to articulate 
what types of interactions do and do not yield that result.95 
 
 92 See, for example, Elizabeth Sepper, Democracy, Human Rights, and Intelligence 
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990, 994–95 (2013) (favoring ex ante constraints on the executive). 
 94 See Deeks, 82 Fordham L Rev at 833–34 (cited in note 27). 
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This Essay does not attempt to draw crisp lines between for-
eign influences that should count as contributing to US checks 
and balances and those that should not. Its primary contribution 
is to illuminate the existence, nature, and impact of some forms of 
foreign influence on that system. The constraints described herein 
are definable and, to some extent, quantifiable. They are also 
largely legal in nature, and they are therefore easier to identify 
than diplomatic or foreign policy pressures that at a broader level 
also constrain the executive or stimulate inter- or intrabranch di-
alogue. And these constraints tend to diminish or increase the 
power of one branch of government rather than affect the power 
of the United States as a whole. The more directly one can trace 
the impact of foreign action on an executive decision to undertake 
less than is fully authorized under US law, the more clearly the 
foreign act should be treated as implicating checks and balances. 
Second, the extent to which foreign actors can and will con-
strain the executive depends on the size of the delta between the 
laws and policies of the United States and those of its allies. As 
long as the states from which the United States requires coopera-
tion—particularly Western democracies such as EU member 
states, Canada, and Australia—have laws and policies in place 
that are more protective of certain rights than those of the United 
States, foreign actors will continue to place power-reducing pres-
sures on the executive. If, however, foreign actors face new securi-
ty threats and expand their own intelligence authorities, then 
pressures on the US executive might diminish, further affecting 
the power balance within the United States.96 Likewise, if US 
laws and policies shift in a rights-protective direction, the quan-
tum of foreign constraints on the executive will shrink. 
Third, although these foreign pressures may enhance US 
checks and balances directly (as when foreign companies produce 
useful information for Congress) or indirectly (by producing com-
parable effects), they are not necessarily democracy enhancing 
overall. Many of these foreign constraints reflect a direct or tran-
sitive imposition of foreign values on executive branch actions. 
There is nothing unlawful about this imposition: it results from 
foreign actors properly implementing their own laws and policies. 
But the constraints on the executive do not flow from a US 
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democratic (or even countermajoritarian) decision to rein in exec-
utive intelligence activities. Thus, the effect on the executive that 
external checks produce may be very similar to that produced by 
internal checks: an executive constrained in its ability to engage 
in a particular intelligence activity. But the reasons and values 
behind the external checks, such as a desire to promote another 
government’s foreign policy goals or publicize a controversial cov-
ert CIA or NSA activity, may not be values that the US demos 
would support. 
Nevertheless, these foreign pressures may bear certain vir-
tues when compared to pressures from within the US demos, as 
from human rights NGOs and other interest groups outside the 
government that contest US intelligence policies. These domestic 
groups are not national-security experts, and they often cannot 
accurately balance the full range of equities at stake when as-
sessing the propriety of a particular executive policy.97 In con-
trast, at least some of the actors discussed in Part II are educated 
about national-security issues, either because they face compara-
ble issues within their own governments or because they have a 
sophisticated technological understanding of the ways in which 
certain intelligence activities operate. Though they are not part of 
the US democracy, their pressures may in some cases be more 
sensibly directed than pressures by those within the United 
States who lack substantive national-security experience. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress and the courts face significant hurdles in conducting 
traditional interbranch checks and balances in the national-
security arena, and there is little reason to think that this dynam-
ic will change soon. But there are other sources of pressure on our 
heavily dominant executive, particularly from beyond our borders. 
In the intelligence arena, in which the United States relies in sig-
nificant ways on foreign partners and advanced technology to ad-
dress potent nonstate threats, a variety of foreign actors have 
demonstrated their abilities to diminish the executive’s national-
security dominance—by either stimulating the functioning of US 
checks and balances or directly limiting the executive’s freedom of 
operation. In a world in which spying becomes increasingly publi-
cized, contentious, and regulated, foreign actors undoubtedly will 
continue to check the US executive in subtle but powerful ways. 
 
 97 See Katyal, Book Review, 126 Harv L Rev at 1002 (cited in note 93). 
